In this issue of Neuron, Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) demonstrate that EEG signatures of real and fictive learning differ early in processing, but the latent information in each event converges at the temporospatial nexus commonly associated with the P3b component.
It is apparent that people can learn by committing actions and also by observing the outcomes of actions not taken. The outcomes of such ''what if'' scenarios are known as counterfactual learning, and they share many common processes associated with learning by direct action selection (Boorman et al., 2011; Chiu et al., 2008; Hayden et al., 2009 ). Yet, there remain many questions where these processes inevitably diverge and where they may possibly reconverge. In this issue of Neuron, Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) used electroencephalography (EEG) to investigate the fine-grained temporal divergence in neural processes between direct and counterfactual conditions, including how the latent information in each trial converges on a final common pathway to influence future action selection.
The Current Study
In this experiment, conditions were differentiated by the lynchpin of volitional choice to select or avoid a risky gamble associated with different images. Over time, participants learned the reward probabilities of these images, and selected more likely ones and avoid less likely ones. Since feedback was provided in either case, Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) were able to investigate neurobehavioral adaptations to wins versus losses on gambles that were selected (reinforcement versus punishment) or avoided (for the sake of descriptive eloquence, we will call these regret versus relief). Note that in abstention, wins that would be reinforcing become regretful and a loss that would be punishing invokes relief. While punishing feedback to selected gambles evoked well-known alterations in the averaged EEG over midfrontal areas (i.e., the feedback-related negativity and P3a), ''fictive'' regretful feedback to avoided actions failed to modulate these midfrontal activities and were instead associated with a novel finding of altered early occipital activity. Yet, regardless of the decision differentiation, the latent information carried by worse-than-expected feedback had a common influence over later EEG activities, in which punishment and regret were associated with similar modulation of parietal activities 200-600 ms postfeedback. The spatiotemporal nature of this finding aligns with another well-known EEG construct: the P3b component (so named as it is the third major positive deflection in the event-related potential, arriving in time after the anterior P3a described earlier).
Two Roads Diverged
The difference in midfrontal versus occipital activities due to real versus fictive feedback was predicated on the purely cognitive interpretation invoked by choosing or avoiding the gamble. Both of these responses required action commission: participants had to press a button to choose the gamble or press a different button to abstain. Thus, fictive feedback conditions were associated with action commission, but this action commission did not invoke an alteration of midfrontal activities to worse-thanexpected feedback. As Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) note, it appears that choosing to abstain from a gamble is in some ways like not committing an action at all.
Previous EEG studies of counterfactual learning have only revealed the outcome of the nonselected gamble following a two alternative forced choice scenario (Goyer et al., 2008; Gu et al., 2011; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004) . These studies all revealed diminished but reliable alteration of the midfrontal feedback-related negativity and P3a to regret on the road not taken; yet, none investigated the consequence when no road is taken. It appears that some important ingredient is missing in mediofrontal systems when people choose to abstain-but what could that be? It was recently reported that these same EEG signals were not modulated when participants failed to develop an expectation (Bismark et al., 2013) , but Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) suggest that this was not the case here, as prediction errors were associated with clear EEG correlates to both real and fictive feedback. Pure observation of punishment does yield a modulation of these EEG signals (Yu and Zhou, 2006) , but learning requires more than just observation. These new findings clearly motivate the need for a more sophisticated understanding of the manner by which learning in mediofrontal cortex is contingent on expectation, agency, or both.
All Roads Lead to P3b
By applying algorithmic modeling (''Q learning''), Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) were able to derive the latent information associated with varied parameters that determine learning and action selection: the value of committing an action for each stimulus (Q value), the valence and surprise of the feedback (prediction error), and the rate at which feedback information was integrated to update Q values (learning rate). By using the trial-by-trial values of each of these latent constructs in a multiple regression at each time point in the EEG, Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) revealed that there were common conjunctions between prediction error, learning rate, and the probability of switching the response for the upcoming trial in parietal areas 200-600 ms postfeedback (i.e., P3b). Thus, it appears that P3b activities reflect the convergence of constructs associated with updating stimulus value information in the service of adaptive control over behavior.
To the imperative stimuli representing the gambles, Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) revealed separate EEG activities that correlated with the Q value of committing an action and the confidence in action selection (Q values farther from the maximally ambiguous 0.5 probability of selecting versus avoiding). While the state-action Q value was associated with early prefrontal activities (cf. Hunt et al., 2012) , confidence in that choice was associated with increased activity in the spatiotemporal nexus of the P3b. This is intriguing: P3b activities not only reflected information for updating stateaction values and influencing future action selection (following feedback) but also reflected information about the confidence in that state-action value (to the gambling stimuli), which Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) note could be used to mitigate the influence of misleading probabilistic feedback. The astute reader may intuit that these activities should be reciprocally related-and in fact Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) demonstrated that smaller stimulus-locked P3b and larger feedback-locked P3b contributed independent variance when predicting future behavioral switches from the current choice. This may be interpreted as a mechanistic description of how low decision confidence and highly surprising aversive feedback can lead to altered decision making.
Driven by Data
The multiple regression approach used here capitalizes on prior knowledge of temporospatial EEG features (e.g., P3b), but side-steps methodological and interpretive pitfalls common to the selection of event-related potential components. In addition, the operational definition of cognitive events based on algorithmic modeling facilitates a transparent and replicable method for assessing the latent cognitive features thought to influence such neural signals. The advantage of this combined data-driven method (with appropriate correction for multiple comparisons) is exemplified here in the definition of the information content of neural signals associated with P3b.
The psychological significance of P3b has been long known, but an appropriately sensitive and specific definition remains be elusive. In a recent review, Nieuwenhuis et al. (2005) summarized how subjective probability and motivational significance, modulated by attention, codetermine P3b amplitude. The P3b component is correlated with the algorithmic quantification of surprise (Mars et al., 2008) and has also been shown to predict the decision to switch behavioral responses (Chase et al., 2010) , yet rarely have these multitudinous definitions and disparate findings been combined to provide an inclusive description of the neurobehavioral correlates of P3b. Indeed, a single global definition of this neural event would be inappropriate, as Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) demonstrated an inversion of the relationship between P3b amplitude and behavioral outcome depending on whether the neural signal was locked to the gambling image or to the feedback.
By stepping away from cross-trial averaging and oftentimes subjective peakpicking methods common to eventrelated potential analyses, Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) have been able to provide novel insight into a wider class of interrelated neurobehavioral phenomena. However, the major caveat of such a datadriven approach is a lack of theoretical motivation and generalizability. These deficiencies in each method may be best addressed by a synthesis: capitalizing on the foundations provided by the rich literature of event-related potentials while developing methodological advancements to push past previous boundaries.
Future advancements may include a better understanding of the information carried within the EEG spectra within this temporospatial network, as phase and power information may reflect different aspects of information content (Buzsá ki, 2010) . Imminent reports are also sure to further refine algorithmic definitions for subjective probability (e.g., prediction error) and motivational significance (e.g., learning rate); it will remain a challenge to provide unbiased, transparent, and highly generalizable definitions of unobservable cognitive events. Yet, as demonstrated by Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) , we are likely to converge on a common understanding the neural bases of higher cognitive functions from many different paths.
